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The Rape of Title IH
Title III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 19701 lowered the mini-
mum voting age to 18 in both national and state elections. In Oregon v.
Mitchell 2 the Supreme Court held five to four that Congress had the power to
lower the voting age in federal elections, but realigned and also held five to
four that Congress had exceeded its legislative authority in overriding state
age voter qualifications. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall held
1. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285 (June 22,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Title III]. Title III of the Act provides:
DECLARATION AND FINDINGS
SEC. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and
application of the requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a
precondition to voting in any primary or in any election-
(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eight-
een years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote-a particularly
unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibili-
ties imposed upon such citizens;
(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet
twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws
that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu-
tion; and
(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State
interest.
(b) In order to secure the constitutional rights set forth in subsection
(a), the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial of the
right to vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or over.
PROHIBITION
SEC. 302. Except as required by the Constitution, no citizens of the
United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political
subdivision in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote
in such primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen
years of age or older.
ENFORCEMENT
SEC. 303. (a) (I) In the exercise of the powers of the Congress under the
necessary and proper clause of section 8, article I of the Constitution, and
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, the Attorney
General is authorized and directed to institute in the name of the United
States such actions against States or political subdivisions, including actions
for injunctive relief, as they may determine to be necessary to implement the
purposes of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 305. The provisions of title III shall take effect with respect to any
primary or election held on or after January 1, 1971.
2. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Oregon sought an injunction against the enforcement
of Title III. The United States sought to enjoin the states of Arizona and Idaho from
enforcing their age voter qualifications, literacy tests, and residency and absentee ballot-
ing provisions to the extent they conflicted with the other provisions of the 1970 Voting
Rights Act Amendments.
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that the entire act was constitutional while Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Harlan and Stewart took the opposite position. Justice Black's
vote produced the anomalous result. While the ultimate holding of the case
is clear, the ninety-page decision reveals the complexity of the issues before
the Court. In determinng the constitutionality of this statute the Court was
forced to reexamine the relationship between the states and Congress and
ultimately between Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress did not pass
Title III without considering alternative means of reducing the voting age,3
and it was only after concluding that there was no compelling state interest to
justify the state restriction of the franchise to those citizens aged 21 or older
did Congress enact this legislation. After making this determination, and
subsequent relying on the rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan,4 Congress
enacted Title III as an appropriate exercise of it's enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 5
Initially this article will examine the two bases upon which Congress acted
by discussing the emergence of the right to vote as protected by the fourteenth
amendment. An analysis of the case will follow. Finally this article will an-
alyze the effects of Oregon v. Mitchell upon the states, the power of Congress,
and the role of the Supreme Court in 'Our Federalism'."
The Right to Vote
The right to vote in both national and state elections has been slow to achieve
constitutional dimensions. 7  Nowhere does the constitution expressly confer
3. Hearings. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 160-282 (1970). [Hereinafter referred to
as HEARINGS].
Although Title III did pass the Senate 64-17, 116 CoNG. REc. § 3585 (daily ed.
March 12, 1970), there was considerable discussion both on the floor and in committee
whether to lower the voting age by statute or by amendment. The solicited opinions
of noted constitutional lawyers, Dean Pollack and Archibald Cox, were inconclusive
as to whether such a statute would pass judicial scrutiny. The discussions of constitu-
tional principles and authorities, however, were greatly tempered by the urgency of ac-
complishing the desired goal. Congressional passage of the statute not only affirma-
tively resolved the legality of the statute but reflected the political decision to forego
the traditional method by which radical changes in the electorate have been accom-
plished.
4. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See note 21 infra.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
Section 1. [No] State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added).
Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
6. Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
7. See Kirby, The Constitutional Right to Vote, 45 N.Y.U. LAw REv. 995 (1970).
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the right of suffrage; s indeed if it were expressly granted in the Bill of Rights
then any state qualification of this right would have to meet the strictest judi-
cial scrutiny.9 Although the states have "broad powers under which the right
of suffrage may be exercised,"' 1 this area of primary responsibility may be ex-
ercised only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution.1 Clearly any
state practice which denies a citizen the right to vote on account of race or
color is prescribed by the fifteenth amendment and will meet with the strictest
congressional and judicial scrutiny.12  The majority of early state suffrage is-
sues, however, were argued and decided on the basis of the equal protection
8. "The Constitution . . . does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). Once suffrage has been
granted, it is protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Black, Harlan, JJ. dissenting). However it may be ar-
gued that the right to vote in federal elections is directly conferred upon citizens in the
sense that article I, section 2 and the seventeenth amendment define the qualifications
for voting in federal elections.
Although the "nonjusticiability" of the republican form of government clause has
long been an impregnable barrier to the invocation of the Court's adjudicatory powers,
a viable argument could be made that the right to vote is implicit in state elections.
A republican form of government which Congress must guarantee to the states in
accordance with the Constitution must mean the exercise of the suffrage by all those
who may competently participate.
"Indeed, the right to vote is also central to the First Amendment. As a compre-
hensive charter of freedom of political expression, that Amendment embraces not only
the rights specifically enumerated, but also those additional rights necessary for their
full exercise and enjoyment." Brief for Plaintiff at 31 n.22, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970). See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-430 (1963); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
9. "1 think State regulations should be viewed quite differently where it touches or
involves freedom of speech, press, religion, petition, assembly, or other specific safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights. It is the duty of this Court to be alert to see that these
Constitutionally preferred rights are not abridged." Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
471 (1957) (Black, J. dissenting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Supreme Court held that a state must fur-
nish an indigent prisoner with a trial transcript in order to perfect an appeal in a
criminal case. The traditional test of "invidious"' or "hostile" discrimination was
rejected due to the sensitive constitutional rights involved. Therefore, even though there
was neutrality on the face of the statute and any inequality might be accidental, there
was a positive right placed upon the states to insure equality. "Such a law would
make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless thing ....... 351 U.S. at
17 (emphasis added).
10. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; amends. XIV, XV, XVII,
XIX, and XXIV.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1-2 state:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
In Gaston County v. United States, the use of the county's literacy test was sus-
pended. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the Voting Rights
of 1965 was held constitutional as an appropriate exercise of Congress' enforce-
[Vol. 20:764
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clause of the fourteenth amendment, and various qualifications placed on the
right to vote by the states were upheld under a "rational nexus" test.18 The
Warren Court was moving toward the realization of the right to vote as a basic
constitutional right by applying a more sophisticated standard in defining
"equal protection."'1 4 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 5 the Court
found that the right to vote was denied some Virginia citizens by means of a
state poll tax. Although the poll tax was applied in a non-discriminatory
manner, Justice Douglas speaking for the Court stated:
Wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. Since voter quali-
fications have no relationship to wealth, or paying a tax, the degree
of discrimination is irrelevant. In this context-that is, as a con-
dition of obtaining the ballot,-the requirement of fee paying causes
invidious discrimination.' 6
The Warren Court failed to heed Justice Frankfurter's 1946 warning in
ment powers under Section 2 of the fifteenth amendment. After substantial fact-
finding Congress could reasonably conclude that literacy tests and related devices
were administered in a discriminatory fashion with the purpose of disenfranchising
Negroes. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), Oklahoma's grandfather
clause declared unconstitutional as a denial of the right to vote.
13. Traditionally state legislation challenged under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment carried a presumption of constitutionality. As long as there
existed a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the statute and a legitimate
governmental interest the statute was upheld. This test of constitutionality did not
bar consequential discrimination flowing from the application of such state laws. In
Lassiter v. Northhampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), a North Carolina liter-
acy test requirement was examined on equal protections grounds and upheld. A "ra-
tional nexus" test was applied and the Court found the literacy requirement suffi-
ciently related to a permissible state policy of promoting intelligent use of the ballot.
In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), the Court unanimously upheld a poll tax
for state elections. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), held literacy, resi-
dency, poll tax, and morality requirements as valid under the equal protection clause.
That application of these devices denied Negroes the right to vote contrary to the
fifteenth amendment was not argued in any of the above cases.
14. The Court has rejected the proposition that the equal protection clause is lim-
ited to intentional, arbitrary, or invidious discriminations affecting an identifiable class
of persons. Rather it discussed the right to vote as a specially protected and funda-
mental right:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Clearly people cannot be excluded
from exercising this right because of state qualifications or classifications unless those
classifications are supported by a compelling state interest. See Claude, Nationaliza-
tion of the Electoral Process, HEARINGS at 395-424 (1970).
15. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Black, Harlan, JJ. dissenting). See also Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) (voters cannot be classified on the basis of where they live; all
votes must be weighted equally in statewide elections).
16. 383 U.S. at 668.
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Colegrove v. Green17 that "Courts ought not to enter this [congressional dis-
tricting] political thicket,' u8 and in Baker v. Carr"0 the judiciary embarked
upon a revolutionary course of vindicating fundamental principles of repre-
sentative government. In a series of "reapportionment" cases the Court es-
tablished a constitutional doctrine of equal representation for equal numbers
of people.20  The Court made clear that once the franchise has been granted
to a class of persons the equal protection clause requires true equality in the
exercise of that right. Thus while the equal protection clause fully protects
the quality of the vote among the enfranchised elite, the state may still capri-
ciously withold the ballot from an entire class of voters.
The Court addressed the issue of the total disenfranchisement of a class of
persons on grounds other-than those specifically prohibited by the Constitu-
tion in Carrington v. Rash.2' In Carrington it was held that a Texas consti-
tutional provision which prevented citizens who had entered military service
in another state from acquiring voting residence in Texas so long as he re-
mained in the military was a denial of the equal protection. The Court could
have declared this statute unconstitutional on bases which would have placed
the right to vote on secure constitutional grounds. 22 Instead, it laid the basis
for perpetuating a case-by-case approach to state voting qualification by se-
lectively reviewing the degree of each alleged discrimination. Since Carring-
ton, however, a line of cases has emerged in which the Supreme Court applied
the "compelling state interest" standard in evaluating the exclusion of other-
wise qualified voters from a special election. 23  In Kramer v. Union Free
17. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (Black J. dissenting).
18. Id. at 556.
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Frankfurter, Harlan, JJ. dissenting). A claim asserted
under the equal protection clause challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment
of seats in a state legislature, can be maintained in the federal courts; the appellants
had standing to sue, the issue was justiciable, and the courts had jurisdiction.
20. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court held as a basic constitu-
tional standard that the equal protection clause required both houses of a state legisla-
ture be apportioned on the basis of population. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964), the Court held that the test to determine the validity of congressional dis-
tricting schemes was one of equality of population among various districts. In Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court adopted its "one man one vote" holding. For
an excellent analysis of the reapportionment cases see R. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT:
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965).
21. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
22. The Court could have held that the federal statute forbids such discrmina-
tions. The State of Texas conceded that but for the petitioner's uniform he would
have been eligible to vote in El Paso County, Texas. Id. at 91. Therefore, under
the supremacy clause (U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) the Texas statute could have been
invalidated. The federal statute was also a proper exercise of Congress' power under
article I, section 8, clause 12 "to raise and support Armies." Since petitioner had been
eligible to vote in his home state before entering military service, it could have
also been grounds for invalidation of Texas' statute that it unconstitutionally abridged
"a privilege or immunity" of a citizen of the United States.
23. In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), the Court held that a Maryland
[Vol. 20:764
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School District2 4 the Court laid down its strongest statement of why the tra-
ditional presumption of constitutionality cannot be applied to those voting
rights cases which affect the very nature of the representative process itself:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "ra-
tional" classifications in other types of enactments are based on an
assumption that the institutions of state government are structured
so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge
to the statute is in effect a challenge to this basic assumption the
assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitu-
tionality. 25
The traditional avenues for effecting a remedy to the claimed discrimination,
i.e., participation in the political process, are often foreclosed when the disen-
franchised are "locked into a self-perpetuating status of exclusion from the
electoral process."'26
In each case the Court emphasized and reaffirmed the states' general pre-
rogatives in areas of citizenship, age, and residency qualifications in general
elections. Recently however, several three-judge federal courts, after apply-
ing a compelling state interest standard, have held that state residency require-
ments were invalid under the equal protection clause. 27  Before Title III was
enacted by Congress, however, the courts granted such deference to state au-
thority to set age requirements that challenges to the 21-year old minimum
voting age for state and federal elections were dismissed for failure to state a
statute excluding residents of a federal enclave located in Maryland from voting in
state elections was held unconstitutional. "[B]efore [the right to vote] can be re-
stricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by
it must meet close constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 422.
In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court held an election
statute prohibiting non-property owners from voting in special revenue bond elections
invalid. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the
Court held invalid a provision of a New York law limiting voter eligibility in local
school elections to those who owned or leased taxable property or had a child enrolled
in school. In each case the state defended the classification on the grounds that
the excluded class was riot primarily interested in the issues of the election and that
only those persons substantially affected by the resolutions of certain issues should
have a voice in voting. The Court rejected the states arguments and found that the
effects of a vote often fall indiscriminately on all residents; moreover the Court held
that in none of the cases did the statute purport to do what the state claimed it was
supposed to do. "[Whether] a state might, in some circumstances limit the franchise
to those primarily interested . . ." was left unresolved. 395 U.S. at 704. See also
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
24. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
25. Id. at 628.
26. Id. at 640.
27. The compelling state interest test has been applied to state residency require-
ments. The one-year residency requirement was held unconstitutional in Kohn v.
Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970). See also Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843
E.D. Va. 1970 appeal filed, Virginia Bd. of Election v. Bufford, 39 U.S.L.W. 3405
(U.S. Mar. 16, 1971). Both cases declared that any residency requirement limits
1971]
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cause of action. 28  Yet a denial of the vote is an egregious wrong if it has
been unreasonably imposed. A person excluded from voting in all elections
is no less discriminated against than one permitted to vote in some, or whose
vote has been diluted such as in the reapportionment cases. To hold that a
state is less compelled to justify an age qualification is patently untenable.
First, assuming arguendo that some age qualification is necessary and valid,
it does not follow that the existing age qualification is necessarily valid. Sec-
ond, because the present age qualification was reasonable at a prior time in
our history does not mean that it is reasonable now. The justification for age
requirements is to insure the intelligent exercise of the ballot increased edu-
cational opportunities and the subsequent change in youth compells us to re-
examine the voting standard. Therefore, the compelling interest test should
be applied in all cases involving the right to vote. The 18-20 year olds may
not be "fenced out from the franchise"2 9 without subjecting the states to a
heavy burden of justifying their age requirements.
Congress was aware of the constitutional concern shown by the courts to
broaden access to the right to vote; it was also increasingly preoccupied with
insuring the legitimacy and credibility of the representative form of govern-
ment in America.30 Since Congress passed Title III pursuant to its enforce-
two fundamental rights, the right to vote and the right to travel interstate, a
privilege and immunity of citizens of the United States. Therefore, the state must show
a compelling state interest served by these requirements. In Kohn it was noted that
durational residency requirements have fallen into judicial disfavor. See also Burg v.
Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970); Broumstein v. Ellington (M.D. Tenn.
1970); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969). The case of Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F.
Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965), which upheld the
Maryland residency requirement, was distinguished in Bufford on the ground that
at the time of the decision the compelling state interest test had not matured and had
not been engrafted upon the criteria used to weigh the validity of state laws. Since
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904), which upheld a one-year residency require-
ment, was not controlling, the issue of the reasonableness of state laws is a continuing
question.
28. Even before the passage of Title III, individuals between the ages of 18-21
initiated suits in federal courts alleging the unconstitutionality of the state minimum age
voting qualification of 21. See Brief for Appellants, Puishes v. Mann (9th Cir. 1970)
reprinted in Hearings at 509-560, and Complaint, WMCA Vote at 18 Club v. Bd. of
Elections, 319 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) reprinted in HEARINGS at 561-582.
29. "'Fencing out' from the franchise a section of the population because of the
way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
94 (1965).
30. Proponents of Title III wanted to insure the legitimacy of both state and federal
governments by extending to young adults the 'right' to legitimately participate in the
democratic process. See HEARINGS. Congress was particularly concerned with the high
proportion of men between the ages of 18-21 who were subjected to the draft and in-
deed had been killed in Vietnam. While "conscription without representation" has
long been the hue and cry of the proponents of the 18-year old vote, more than one
Senator was of the opinion that it was also in the interest of national security to
assure that those participating in the nation's war have the right to select those
persons making the decision to fight. See 116 CONG. REC. 3058 (daily ed. March 5,
[Vol. 20:764
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ment powers under Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the focus of the
judiciary's review would presumably be on this congressional power rather
than on the superseded state law under the fourteenth amendment.8 ' The
Court previously upheld Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Right Act' 2 against
a New York state assertion that prior to the enactment there had been no de-
termination by any court that the New York literacy test was a violation of
equal protection, and that Congress' power under Section 5 was restricted to
situations where a court had found a state enactment unconstitutional. The
Court specifically rejected this argument:
. ..A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determina-
tion that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress
violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congres-
sional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourceful-
ness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amend-
ment. a"
Section 5 was described as a "positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4  The
states of Oregon and Texas distinguished Katzenbach v. Morgan on the
ground that Congress' legislation was directed toward removing a racial dis-
crimination particularly cognizable under the equal protection clause. In
Katzenbach the congressional power to determine and correct violations of
the equal protection clause not involving racial discrimination was left unde-
termined. In Oregon v. Mitchell that question was finally answered.
Opinions of the Eight Justices
The effect of Title III was more than an expansion of the franchise. It
1970) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
During World War II Congress suspended state voter qualification statutes to en-
sure military personnel the right to vote. See Brief for NAACP as amicus curiae at
5, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The NAACP argued that Congress had
the authority to pass Title III on the basis of article I, section 8 and the necessary
and proper clause.
31. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), established that Section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment gave Congress power equivalent to its power under the neces-
sary and proper clause. Distinguishing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), in which the Court upheld a state literacy test absent a
congressional statute forbidding such a practice, Justice Brennan stated that the "...
inquiry was not whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause
itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied, but rather could
Congress effectively prohibit the enforcement of such a state law by acting itself."
Id. at 649.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1964).
33. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
34. Id. at 651.
19711
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marked a deep congressional inroad into an area traditionally left to the states.
Although purporting to decide the constitutionality of Title III on the sole
basis of Congress' power to pass the statute, under Section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment, 35 Justices Burger, Stewart, Harlan and Blackmun colored
their judicial inquiry with a scepticism born of this unusual procedure.36 By
their reading of the Constitution and it's history they clearly rejected Con-
gress' proposition that it could alter the qualifications for voting in either
state or federal elections by mere legislation. They concurred with Justice
Black's finding that the power to regulate state voter qualifications was re-
served to the states but dissented from his holding that a reading of article I,
section 2 with article I, section 438 gave Congress the power to regulate fed-
eral voter qualifications. They stated that "manner" in article I, section 4,
. . . can hardly be read to mean qualifications for voters, when it is
remembered that Section 2 of the same Article I explicitly speaks
of the representatives. It is plain, in short, that when the Framers
meant qualifications they said qualifications. That word does not
appear in Article I Section 4.39
Furthermore, they not only examined Congress' power, but summarily eval-
uated as reasonable the state age qualification laws that Congress was at-
tempting to displace. 40 Having made this substantive determination they pre-
cluded Congress from making a finding which concededly was essential to
sustain Congress' power to pass this legislation. Thus, the broad powers of
Congress recognized by the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan41 were limited
here on factual grounds. 42
35. "Before turning to a discussion of my views, it seems appropriate to state that
we are not called upon in these cases to evaluate or appraise the wisdom of abolishing
literacy requirements ... or of reducing the voting age to 18. Whatever we may think
as citizens, our single duty as judges is to determine whether the legislation before us
was within the constitutional power of Congress to enact." 400 U.S. at 282.
36. "From the standpoint of the bedrock of the Constitutional structure of this Na-
tion, these cases bring us to a crossroad that is marked with a formidable 'stop' sign.
That sign compels us to pause before we allow those decisions to carry us to the
point of sanctioning Congress' decision to alter state-determined voter qualifications by
simple legislation, and to consider whether sounder doctrine does not in truth require
us to hold that one or more of the changes which Congress has thus sought to make can
be accomplished only by constitutional amendment." Id. at 152.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I § 4.
39. 400 U.S. at 288.
40. "Yet it is inconceivable to me that this Court would ever hold that the denial of
the vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21 constitutes such an invidious dis-
crimination as to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 295,
n.14.
41. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
42. The congressional statute dealt with age classifications and as such Morgan
did not apply because the "compelling state interest" test only would apply to racial
discriminations.
[Vol. 20:764
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In reviewing the constitutionality of the 1970 statute Justice Harlan pre-
dictably was wedded to the historical intent of the Framers of both the Consti-
tution and the Reconstruction Amendments.43  This historical probing is a
necessary concommitant of his philosophy on the role of the Supreme Court.44
Since the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments did not affect the tra-
ditional power of the states to establish voter qualifications in both state and
federal elections, Congress may not use these amendments as a basis for alter-
ing voter qualifications. 45  Hence, the Reconstruction Amendments did not
void state voter qualifications but merely deprived a state of it's full repre-
sentation if it placed racial qualifications on the franchise. 46  Alternatively
Justice Harlan found that the right to vote was not among the privileges or
immunities of a citizen of the United States protected by the fourteenth
amendment. 47 To deviate from the constitutional interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment would require the passage of an amendment; otherwise the
Court would be reading it's policy predilections into the Constitution. If the
Court can not do this by decision, Congress may not do this by legislation.
Believing that a national judgment on voter qualifications is no more astute
than those of the states, Harlan saw no merit in Congress' power to pass this
statute under Section 5 since,
I think it is fair to say that the suggestion that members of the age
group between 18 and 21 are threatened with unconstitutional dis-
crimination, or that any hypothetical discrimination is likely af-
fected by lowering the voting age, is little short of fanciful. 48
On the other hand, Justices Douglas, Marshall, White and Brennan did not
consider it an affront to the Constitution that Congress by-passed the amend-
ment process. They held Title III constitutional and an appropriate exercise
43. In previous cases involving judicial or congressional power to regulate elec-
tions Harlan always wrote a detailed opinion involving historical analysis on the intent
of the Framers. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). For an excellent
discussion of Harlan's theory of the fourteenth amendment see Van Alstyne, The
Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 33.
44. For Harlan a Supreme Court Justice must decide the cases in light of the
Constitution and this means that he must discuss the intent of the Framers. "Every
Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. . . . If its meaning in any place
is left open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we
cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the
evidence which they have left on the question." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
677 (1866) (remarks of Senator Sumner). Harlan believes this view to be undoubtedly
sound.
45. 400 U.S. at 155. Previously Harlan held that equal protection is irrelevant to
state suffrage issues. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
46. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 169-170.
47. Id. at 164, 175.
48. Id. at 212.
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of congressional power under Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as in-
terpreted in Morgan.49  Confining themselves to the merits of the govern-
ment's arguments, they did not focus upon the issue whether a state statute
prohibiting 18 year olds from voting would withstand judicial scrutiny under
a compelling state interest standard. Congress could reasonably have con-
cluded through its legislative fact-finding that the denial of the franchise to
those 18 to 21 was a denial of equal protection. Since nothing in Section 5
limits Congress' power solely to racial discrimination, and since, according to
Mitchell, Congress can legislate to obtain equality in ways consistent with the
Constitution, the proper role for the judiciary must be to affirm Congress'
judgment.50 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and White not only devoted con-
siderable time to rebutting Harlan's conclusion concerning the fourteenth
amendment, but revealed the ambiguities which clouded the passage of both
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.51 They attempted to show that any
reference to historical interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments
would be at best conjectural authority.
Justice Douglas wrote a separate opinion upholding Title 11152 under both
the equal protection and the privileges and immunities clauses. Using article
I, section 2, the fifteenth and seventeenth amendments, and the Supreme
Court cases since Ex Parte Yarborough,"8 Douglas distinguished the right to
vote as a "civil right of the highest order."'54 As a civil right protected by the
fourteenth amendment the issue is the extent of Congress' power under Sec-
tion 5 of that amendment. Congress "might well conclude that a reduction in
the voting age from 21 to 18 was needed in the interests of equal protec-
tion." 5  Where "fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
equal protection clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."56 Since the reach of Sec-
tion 5 is quite broad, when Congress concludes that legislation is necessary
and proper, the Court must let the statute stand.
49. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
50. 400 U.S. at 248, 251.
51. Id. at 252-53.
52. Id. at 135-152.
53. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
54. "Whatever distinction may have been made, following the Civil War, between
'civil' and 'political' rights, has passed into history." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
at 139. Harlan's view of equal protection leads him to conclude that "political" rights
are not protected though "civil" rights are. Id. at 137. Thus Douglas is able to write-
off Harlan's historical findings as irrelevant to the present issue.
55. In Harper v. Virginia State Rd. of Elections, [citation omitted], we stated,
"Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection clause
do change." id. at 139 (emphasis the Court's).
56. Id. at 142, quoting from Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
670 (1966).
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Black's Dilemma
If Justice Black had decided the case upon the Morgan rationale, the focus of
his inquiry should have been the reasonableness of Congress' action under
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Even if he had utilized the second
justification for passage of the Act, i.e., the lack of a compelling state interest
in denying the franchise to 18 to 21 year olds, Justice Black would have had
to decide the case on fourteenth amendment grounds as the other eight Jus-
tices did. However, addressing himself to either of these inquiries would
have compelled him to be consistent vis-a-vis Congress' power to determine
voter qualifications in both national and state elections.
For Justice Black the issue before the Court was a political question involv-
ing ". . . not who is denied equal protection but rather which political body,
State or Federal, is empowered to fix the minimum age of voters."' 57 Hence,
he was forced into the dilemma of finding a two-fold rationale to sustain what
he believes is the inherent right of the federal government to preserve itself,
and simultaneously protect the concept of Federalism. Justice Black circum-
vented the government's argument and based his holding on the seldom-used
article I, section 2 an darticle I, section 4.
Black stated that article I, section 2 gave the states primary responsibility
for setting voter qualifications in congressional elections, and asserted that
article I, section 4 was a "compromise clause"58 which reserved to Congress a
supervisory power over all regulations affecting congressional elections.
Moreover this supervisory power was augmented by the necessary and proper
clause 9 to assure Congress' power over all national elections. Acknowl-
edging that Wesberry v. Sanders60 recognized Congress' power to alter geo-
graphical election districts "to vindicate the people's right to equality of rep-
resentation in the House",61 he surmised that
[No] voter qualification was more important to the Farmers than
the geographical qualification embodied in the concept of Congres-
sional districts. . . . There can be no doubt that the power to alter
congressional district lines is vastly more significant in its effect
than the power to permit 18-year-old citizens to go to the polls and
vote in all federal elections. 62
The issue is Justice Black's underlying premise that a geographical district is
57. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 127 n.10.
58. Id. at 119 n. 2.
59. Id. at 120.
60. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
61. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 121 citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16
(1964).
62. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1971).
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a qualification. He concluded by citing Smiley v. Holm 63 which extensively
interpreted congressional power under article I, section 4 and which explicitly
concluded that Congress does have a supervisory power over national elec-
tions.
It has been undisputed in both Supreme Court6 4 cases and in historical in-
quiries6" that Congress has supervisory powers over the "times, places and
manner" of congressional elections stemming from article I section 4. To
conclude that Congress may also regulate age qualifications it must first be
shown that age qualifications come within the "times places and manner"
clause of article I, section 4. Justice Black never expressly made this deter-
mination.
"Qualifications" in article I, section 2 means age, wealth, property, and resi-
dence requirements,6" all of which are conditions precedent to the exercise of
the ballot. The debates over the adoption of the Constitution reflect two
overriding reasons why the Framers made the qualifications for congressional
election voting dependent upon the states. At the time the Constitution was
written the qualifications in the states were diverse 67 and it was impractical to
set forth constitutional qualifications which would have won state support. 68
Secondly, the extent of national power over any election was greatly con-
tested.6 9 The majority feared that if the national government was given too
much power, Congress could easily perpetuate an aristocratic government. 70
By vesting qualifications in the states, not only would ratification be sucess-
ful,71 but also the states would be more responsive to the peoples right of rep-
resentation.72  Consequently, the question who was to vote was left to the
states.
63. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
64. U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ex
Parte Yarbough, 100 U.S. 661 (1884); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); and
Ex Parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
65. J. STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(3d ed. 1858) [hereinafter cited as STORY'S CONSTITnION], and J. ELLIOT, 5 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES (3d ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT's DEBATES].
66. G. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UNION, § 17, 41 (1882) [hereinafter
cited as G. PASCHAL].
67. 2 STORY'S CONSTITUTION at 637.
68. Id. at 576-587. See also ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 385.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, 60 (Hamilton).
70. "[It] is alleged that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others .... ." Id. No. 60 at 369.
71. On the other hand, the conventions of Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, and Rhode Island accompanied their ratification with a protest against the ex-
ercise of this power and North Carolina refused its ratification on this ground. G.
PASCHAL, at § 329.
72. "Every state has its own particular views and prejudices .... He urged the
necessity of maintaining the existence and agency of the states. Without their coopera-
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It was recognized, however, that national elections could not be left solely
to the will or whim of the states.73  Therefore, article I, section 4 empowered
the states to regulate the "times places and maner" of holding elections but
reserved to Congress the right to alter such regulations. "Times" and "places"
insured that the elections would in fact be held,74 and "manner" referred to the
way the ballots would be counted, i.e., either secret or viva voce, and the in-
tegrity of the regulations for conducting elections. 75 Smiley v. Holm, which
Justice Black cited in Mitchell, clearly interpretated "manner" to refer to pro-
cedural aspects!
The subject matter is the times places and manner of holding elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives. It cannot be doubted that
these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a com-
plete code for Congressional elections, not only as to times and
places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting,
protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices,
counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers and making
and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience
shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right in-
volved ...
This view is confirmed by the second clause of Article I, Section
4, which provides that the Congress may at any time by law make
or alter such regulations, with the single exception stated. The
phrase such regulations plainly refers to regulations of the same
general character that the legislature of the State is authorized to
prescribe with respect to congressional elections. In exercising this
power, the Congress may supplement these state regulations or may
substitute its own.76
Later Supreme Court cases referred to this supervisory power as an indispen-
sable right of Congress to secure the purity and legitimacy of all federal elec-
tions by appropriate legislation. But the Court has left no doubt that voting
qualifications such as age are left to the states.
77
tion it would be impossible to support a republican government over so great an
extent of country." ELLIoT's DEBATES at 239.
73. "[They] could at any moment annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the
choice of persons to administer its affairs." THE FEDERALIST No. 59 at 363 (Hamilton).
74. "If the State legislature were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating
these elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national
situation ... [If] the leaders of a few of the most important states should have en-
tered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election." Id. at 365.
75. G. PASCHAL at § 41.
76. 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932).
77. "We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be
required of voters. But there is a wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence
requirements, age, previous criminal record ...are obvious examples indicating factors
which a State may take into. consideration in determining the qualifications of voters."
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Most constitutional historians believe that the qualifications of article I,
section 2 are reserved to the states and do not refer to any regulation the
states or Congress could make under article I, section 4. 78 Thus, the major-
ity view finds no precedent enabling Congress to set voter qualifications in
either state or federal elections. However, the minority school led by Profes-
sor Crosskey79 believes Congress may regulate all aspects of elections under
it's general legislative authority.8 0 Crosskey states that the Framers feared
the subversion of the election process by the states and they therefore tied
state and federal qualifications together in article I, section 2 to prevent the
states from dealing uniquely with the federal elections."' Since the purpose
of article I, section 2 was not to preserve the inviolate authority of the states
but merely to insure the integrity of national elections, Congress could also
regulate state voter qualifications.8 2
Justice Black justified Congress' power to set age qualification in national
elections primarily as a necessary concommitant of it's broad power to set
what he terms geographical qualifications. Congressional redistricting was
never referred to as a qualification. 3 Secondly, the very cases which Justice
Black cited to establish congressional supervisory power over national elec-
tions distinguished qualifications such as age, which are left to the states, from
"times places and manner" regulations which are left primarily to the states but
which can be overruled by congressional legislation. Therefore, he did not
establish the crucial legal relationship between these two articles, but bor-
rowed the minority8 4 viewpoint to ensure that the national government could
protect its own elections, and reverted to the majority theory8 5 to ensure state
autonomy over voter qualifications in state elections.
Just as Justice Black's holding that Congress could lower the voting age to
18 was prompted by his belief that there was a necessary reservoir of national
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). See
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904) and Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328,
335 (1900).
78. "It cannot be said, with any correctness, that Congress can, in any way, alter
the rights or qualifications of voters." G. PASCHAL at § 83, quoting from STORY'S
CONSTITUTION at § 820.
79. William Crosskey is a contemporary constitutional historian who holds that
"manner" equals "qualification" and hence Congress may prescribe voter qualifications
in both federal and state elections.
80. This general legislative grant is based on the broad language in the preamble,
the necessary and proper clause, and the republican form of government guarantee.
W. CROSSKEY, I POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 363-577 (3d ed. 1965).
81. Id. at 529-30.
82. Id. at 533-37.
83. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84. The majority viewpoint is that "manner" means "qualification".
85. The majority viewpoint is that "manner" does not mean "qualification".
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power for Congress to preserve the representativeness of the national govern-
ment, so he analogized the reservation to the states of the power to set their
own voter qualifications with the maintenance of their sovereignty within the
federal scheme. The intent of the Framers of the Constitution, as expressed
in the tenth amendment and article I was to reserve to the states the exclusive
power to regulate their own elections. This power has been abridged only by
amendments to the Constitution.
Justice Black conceded that Congress' power was quite broad under the en-
forcement clause of the fourteenth amendment but he emphatically qualified
the exercise of that power: it was not intended to strip the states of the power
to govern themselves or to "convert our national government of enumerated
powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of
the whole Nation."' 6 Since voter qualifications are left exclusively to the
states, Congress may only infringe on this power by enforcing the Civil War
Amendments ban on racial discrimination. He stated:
In enacting the 18-year-old vote provisions of the Act now before
the Court, Congress made no legislative findings that the 21-year-
old vote requirements were used by the States to disenfranchise
voters on account of race. I seriously doubt that such a finding,
if made, could be supported by substantial evidence.8 7
The crux of Justice Black's argument is therefore the dogmatic assertion that
voter qualifications and local election practices are determined by the states.
This position is based on little substantive evidence 8 and is very tenuous
when juxtaposed with his admission that "[This] Court has recognized in
some instances that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment pro-
tects against discriminations other than those on account of race."8' 9 Justice
Black appears to be saying that if the Court affirmed Congress' power to set
age qualifications in state and local elections the states would be stripped of
their last vestiges of sovereignty.
The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to make every
discrimination between groups of people a constitutional denial of
equal protection. Nor was the Enforcement Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment intended to permit Congress to prohibit every
discrimination between groups of people. 90
86. 400 U.S. at 128.
87. Id. at 130.
88. Black's opinion was worded with grandiose generalizations. "It is a plain fact of
history that the Framers never imagined .... It is obvious that the whole Constitution
reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications ....... He does, however,
appear to rely on the persuasiveness of Harlan's historical inquiry of the rationale
behind the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 125.
89. Id. at 126-27.
90. Id. at 127.
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Thus, Title III as applied to state voter age qualifications was unconstitu-
tional.
The Twenty-sixth Amendment
Oregon v. Mitchell was a pryrrhic victory for the states. Theoretically their
traditional power to establish voter qualifications was left unchecked; how-
ever the practical ramifications of the decision nullified whatever states' rights
victory they had won. Forty-seven states have the economic burden of pro-
viding a dual-voting system to comply with the Supreme Court's holding.91
Notwithstanding the financial burden, questions would arise as to which elec-
tions are "Federal". For example, are elections of state party delegates who
directly or indirectly choose nominees for federal and state offices "Federal
elections"? Also this bifurcated system might create a "potential for confu-
sion in the tabulation of election results."'92 Due to state procedures, lower-
ing the voting age to 18 and avoiding these court-created entanglements in the
1972 elections will prove impossible in most states. 93
Congress rescued the states from the myriad of problems precipitated by
their victory in Mitchell by quickly proposing the twenty-sixth amendment to
the Constitution. 94 The proposed amendment confers a plenary right on citi-
zens 18 and older to participate in the political process; it is more encompass-
ing that Title III. Title III specifically referred to primary or general elec-
tions whereas the amendment addresses itself to the "right to vote". By en-
91. A dual voting system means those only able to vote in federal elections would
have to use: (1) a special voting machine, i.e., one with a ballot listing only federal
candidates, (2) a voting machine with a complete ballot but a special mechanism to
lock levers under State and local elections or (3) paper ballots with a list of only
federal candidates. A recent survey indicated that a bifurcated voting age qualification
would be expensive and administratively burdensome to operate. The projected expense
of such a system in Connecticut is $1.3 million; New York City is $5 million, St.
Louis is $2.5 million, New Jersey is $1.5 million, Washington State is $200,000,
Chicago is $200,000 and Dade County, Florida is $200,000. It would effect ten mil-
lion potential voters of 8.5 percent of the population over 18. H.R. REP. No. 37, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1971). [Hereinafter cited as No. 37].
92. News Release from Rep. Emanuel Celler, March 2, 1971.
93. First, revision of the voting age qualification requires an amendment to the
state constitutions. Secondly, every state but Delaware requires a referendum. Also,
sixteen states provide for submission of the proposed amendment to two separate
sessions of the state legislature before the referendum stage. Consequently not more
than 20 states could, if they wanted, lower the voting age, and only eight of those
twenty states could do so without resort to some extraordinary procedure such as a
special statewide election. No. 37 at 6, 7.
94. H.R. REs. 223, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
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compassing the entire political selection process, it includes any local, munici-
pal, or state-wide election as well as those state laws which restrict the right to
nominate candidates for these elections on the basis of age.95
The twenty-sixth amendment primarily represents a congressional judg-
ment that a minimum voting age above 18 is unreasonable, discriminatory
and a violation of the equal protections of the laws. The educational level
reached by 18 year olds, the civic and military obligations imposed upon the
18 year olds, and the readiness and capacity to participate in the political
process were the bases upon which Congress made this judgmentY6  The sec-
ond reason for the passage of the amendment at this time was to alleviate the
practical dilemma facing the states. Since there is a reasonable time in which
the state legislatures may ratify the amendment, Congress has effectively of-
fered the states a way out of the miasma.97
Opposition to the amendment is not on it's substantive merits. Rather op-
ponents, like the Court in Mitchell, assume the validity of existing age qualifi-
cations and regard the issue as the sharing of power between the state and
federal governments:
[This] republic will be better served in the long run if the sovereignty
of our States is not further eroded by denying to them the power to
fix non-discriminatory qualifications for voting in their own elec-
tions. 98
The critics cite the wholesome trend of decentralization evidenced by Execu-
tive proposals (revenue sharing) and recent Supreme Court decisions.99 Cer-
tainly after Younger v. Harris'00 there has been a heightened awareness of
"Our Federalism". The nature of this criticism begs the real question by
clouding the right to vote in political penumbra. Any abridgement of the
right to vote regardless of by whom it is imposed may not stand unchallenged.
It is precisely because the states and the Courts have refused to deal with this
reality that Congress did.
Conclusion
If the twenty-sixth amendment is ratified by three-fourths of the states within
seven years the holding of Mitchell will be mooted; however the desired goal
of Title III will have been effected. To look at the decision in this light ig-
95. No. 37 at 8.
96. Id. at 5.
97. More than 45 state legislatures are meeting this year and half of that number
are scheduled to meet in 1972. Special sessions in the Fall of 1971 and in the Spring
of 1973 are likely to be slated to deal with reapportionment. Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
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nores the fundamental constitutional ramifications that Mitchell has produced.
First, it was a rebuke of Congress. The legal analysis which the Court had
applied in cases where the alleged discrimination was the exclusion of a seg-
ment of the population from the electoral process was that of a "compelling
state interest." The exclusion of the 18-20 year olds from the polls should not
have been judged by a different standard. All groups had been "locked
into a self-perpetuating status of exclusion from the electoral process.' u 1
Since five Justices refused to make further incursions into the states' area of
traditional power, they applied a test of reasonableness which had presum-
ably been abandoned in deciding voting rights cases. Furthermore, the effect
of Mitchell was a retreat from the implications in Morgan and a firm re-
minder to Congress that it could not usurp the traditional role of the Court
and decide for itself what constituted a states' denial of equal protection of
the laws. There was no deference to congressional fact-finding; the burden
shifted to Congress to show the propriety of its enactment rather than placing
the burden on those whose enactment was being challenged and superseded
by Congress.
Secondly, Mitchell classified the "right to vote". Although the decision re-
affirmed the power of the states to determine how republican their form of
government is to be and declined to enshroud the right to vote with full con-
stitutional safeguards, the Supreme Court reaffirmed itself as the final arbiter
of the Constitution. Instead of taking the opportunity to focus in on the
merits of what Congress was doing in an area which is inherently preservative
of the foundation of our government, the Court became ingratiated with the
necessity of maintaining a balance of power within our federal system. This
case will loom large in constitutional law. It will be cited whenever uniform
legislation is contemplated by Congress in areas traditionally left to the states,
and whenever the issue of the right to vote arises.
Carole Harris
Judy Ripps
101. 395 U.S. at 640.
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